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Abstract 
Descartes’s mechanistic account of the passions is sometimes dismissed as one which lacks the resources to 
adequately explain the cognitive aspect of emotion. By some, he is taken to be “feeling theorist”, reducing the 
passions to a mere awareness of the physiological state of the soul-body union. If this reading of Descartes’s 
passions is correct, his theory fails not only because it cannot account for the intentional nature of the passions, 
but also because the passions cannot play the role in Descartes’s moral theory they are meant to play. I argue 
that Descartes’s account is not best read as a feeling theory. I defend a reading of the Cartesian passions which 
acknowledges their mechanistic nature, arguing that for Descartes, passions are modes of the soul with 
cognitive significance, they are perceptions of relational axiological properties. Thus, Descartes’s theory of the 
passions has the resources to connect it with an account of good conduct. As a means of elaborating on the 
normative nature of the passions I consider the role of generosity in Descartes’s moral theory. 
 
 
Cartesian generosity is both a virtue and the master passion. The generous person has a form 
of self-mastery that leaves her full of good will for others and, fortified by sound judgement 
about what is most valuable in her person, invulnerable to slights and petty wrongs. 
Generosity is the perfection of our dispositions as practical reasoners in the sense that it 
includes a theoretical understanding of what is most valuable in us and the disposition to act 
in a manner which honours that value. It includes the identification of oneself with one’s will 
and the resolve to use that will well. Descartes’s moral theory is, in part, an exhortation to 
perfect one’s capacity for judgement, to appropriately esteem that capacity, and to develop 
the dispositions associated with that esteem and capacity.    
 
 
ISSN 1393-614X  
Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 9 (2005): 236-260 
____________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
          Emer O'Hagan 
 
237
According to Descartes, the principal utility of moral theory is the regulation of desires. As 
agents our experience is made meaningful by the passions; in order to flourish they must be 
well-ordered. Descartes’s moral theory requires that the passions bear some cognitive 
significance, operating within a representational system which itself serves to maintain and 
benefit the agent. Hence, the passions must be understood in terms which can grant them 
cognitive status sufficient to guide and regulate conduct. Yet some philosophers claim that 
Descartes’s treatment of the passions is excessively mechanical and insufficiently cognitive 
to allow them such a role. They argue that Descartes’s mechanistic theory of the passions 
cannot adequately explain their normative significance in action, as passions are for him a 
mere awareness of a physiological state. Without normative significance, his account of the 
passions is inadequate and his moral theory undermined.  
 
However, Descartes’ account of the passions is more robust than is often supposed. The 
passions operate within the soul-body union to inform and guide us in a manner which 
promotes our well-being. In this paper I will defend a reading of the Cartesian passions which 
acknowledges their mechanistic nature, arguing that for Descartes, passions are modes of the 
soul with cognitive significance, they are perceptions of relational axiological properties, and 
so Descartes’s theory of the passions has the resources to connect it with an account of good 
conduct. As a means of elaborating on the normative nature of the passions I will consider the 
role of generosity in Descartes’s ethics. The generous person is the master of his own 
passions; for Descartes, generosity itself is the key to all the other virtues (Descartes, 1989, A 
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156, A161).  In the virtue and passion of generosity theoretical insight and moral disposition 
come together as practical wisdom.  
 
The Passions 
Descartes wrote his treatise on the passions, The Passions of the Soul, in response to Princess 
Elisabeth’s persistent and acute questioning about the nature of the soul-body interaction. In 
order to distance himself from the Stoics who saw the passions as pathological phenomena to 
be overcome, he described his approach as that of a physicist, not a moral philosopher 
(Rodis-Lewis, 1989, xvi).  Descartes aimed to explain the operation of the passions 
scientifically within the domain of the soul-body union. For Descartes, the bodies of animals 
are automata which, like any mechanism, are moved as a result of the particular organization 
of its parts and facts about mechanical laws. He rejects explanations of the movements of 
animals which make reference to an immanent Aristotelian telos (Rodis-Lewis, 1978, 161). 
The adaptive behaviour of non-human animals is partially regulated by systematic bodily 
events similar to those which cause passions in the souls of persons. In explaining the bodily 
causes of the passions physiologically, Descartes is committed to explaining them as causal 
systems functioning automatically. Because we have the capacity for voluntary action 
humans are not mere automata, so while Descartes seeks a scientific account he must 
reconcile this with his commitment to human self-determination through the will.1  
  
According to Descartes, “Whatever is done or happens afresh is generally called by the 
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Philosophers a Passion with respect to the subject it happens to, and an Action with respect to 
what makes it happen” (Descartes, 1989, A1). Given this dual aspect nature of the passions, 
Descartes must carefully distinguish between the functioning of the body and the soul 
respectively. He must account for the functioning of the passions both in terms of their 
subjective reference and in terms of their mechanical operation within the body, and he must 
reconcile these operations. In the Second and Third Parts of The Passions of the Soul 
Descartes focuses on the role of the will, but in the First Part the focus is on some of the 
machinations involved in the production of a passion. Here he writes that all of the 
movements of the muscles and the senses depend on nerves coming from the brain, 
containing a wind or subtle fluid called “animal spirits”. The heart rarefies the very finest 
parts of the blood which compose the animal spirits. In fact, blood flow plays such an 
important role in the formation of the passions that in one place Descartes speculates that 
watching too many tragedies can gradually constrict the heart, slow the circulation, and 
ultimately cause ill health (Descartes, 1991, 250).  
  
The soul has two types of attributes: actions and passion. The actions of the soul are its 
volitions, they come directly from the soul and depend on it alone. These volitions may have 
as their end either the soul itself, as when one wills to love God, or the body itself, as when 
one wills to take a walk and one’s legs begin to move. The passions are perceptions of the 
soul, and part of thought, although thought without volition. The perceptions of the soul are 
mediated by the nerves and refer to one of three sources: objects outside us which strike our 
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senses, to our body (or body parts), or to our soul (Descartes, 1989, A22). The perceptions 
we refer to the soul are those whose effects are felt as though in the soul itself, they are the 
passions proper.  
  
Passions of the soul, properly so called, are “perceptions or sensations or excitations of the 
soul which are referred to it in particular and which are caused, maintained, and strengthened 
by some movement of the spirits” (Descartes, 1989, A27). In the early part of his treatise 
Descartes considers a fearful response to an animal, the result of a complex causal process. 
Fear is produced when the light reflected off the perceived animal creates images on the 
perceiver’s eyes which, via the optic nerves, make their way to the brain where they form two 
images. The images are consolidated into one after animal spirits direct the images to the 
pineal gland which acts on the soul, causing it to see the animal’s shape. If the shape 
resembles things harmful to the body, if it is frightening, passions are excited in the soul: first 
apprehension, then fear, then terror or boldness. The passionate response depends upon the 
temperament and past experience of the individual. In some cases the flow of animal spirits 
from the pineal gland to the nerves will cause the back to turn and the legs to run away 
(Descartes, 1989, A35-36). 
  
As mechanistic as this sounds, the passions are nonetheless not entirely beyond our control. 
Indeed, Descartes seems very optimistic about our capacities to regulate the passions, 
claiming “there is no soul so weak that it cannot, when well guided, acquire an absolute 
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power over its passions” (Descartes, 1989, A50). Although one cannot will a passion into or 
out of existence directly, one can do so indirectly by considering reasons, or attending to 
objects which are usually connected with an alternative passion. For example, when feeling 
fearful one might consider how one will regret fleeing, or conjure up an image of oneself as 
victor over the feared object (Descartes, 1989, A45). The will is authoritative but needs to 
call upon other cognitive resources. Some times the will can only control or limit the effects 
of a passionate state. For example, when one is in the grip of a passion such as anger, 
Descartes admits, one can only control its effects. In anger the hand will rise to strike one’s 
foe but the will can restrain it (Descartes, 1989, A46).  
  
Non-human animals share with human animals the bodily apparatus which make possible the 
human passions; they too have animal spirits and the pineal gland which regulate their flow. 
Of course, non-human animals cannot have passions of the soul because they don’t have 
souls, but the movement of their nerves and muscles occurs because of the movement of the 
animal spirits. The machinery of their bodies can be adjusted and thus they can be trained to 
behave differently. A dog which is naturally inclined to run towards a partridge, and run 
away once a gun is fired, can nonetheless be trained to stop upon spotting a partridge and run 
towards it upon hearing the gunfire. Because human animals possess reason our capacity to 
remodel our bodily machinery is even greater. We can, through the use of our will, train 
ourselves, so that our passions more readily accord with what is beneficial to us. Although 
we are propitiously constructed, and the passions are guides to what is good, they are 
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imperfect. 
  
Descartes’s position is not, as it is sometimes characterized, one hostile to the body. He 
concludes that the passions are almost all good and are “so useful in this life that our soul 
would have no reason to wish to remain joined to its body for even one minute if it could not 
feel them” (Descartes, 1991, 300). Indeed, Descartes ends his treatise on the passions by 
concluding that all of the good and evil of this life depends upon them, their mastery being an 
enormous benefit for any individual life (Descartes, 1989, A212). We should not try to 
eliminate the passions, but should instead aim for skilful and wise management of them.  
 
Are the Passions Cognitive? 
The particulars of Descartes’s physiology aside, this view of the passions as bodily 
mechanisms aimed at facilitating our survival, and making our lives interesting, is one that 
modern theorists of the emotions are quick to adopt. Descartes’s account of the passions is 
often dismissed, however, not because of its antiquated physiology, but because he is taken to 
be offering a strict feeling theory of the passions. In fact, Descartes is widely misread as a 
feeling theorist.2 Feeling theories treat the emotions as relatively simple, unanalyzable ‘feels’ 
and subsequently focus on the causal mechanisms which produce them. Feeling theories of 
the emotions reduce them to sensations or bodily states, making the conscious feeling of the 
physical state the emotion. Thus feeling theories deny the passions both an intentional object 
and any significant role in the guidance of behaviour.   
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William Lyons is perhaps typical of those who dismiss Descartes as a feeling theorist. He 
argues that Descartes’s description of the passions of the soul is really an account of the 
causation of emotion, not of emotion itself. Lyons takes the passivity of the passions to be 
fundamental to Descartes’s view, and so interprets the Cartesian passions as particular forms 
of bodily commotion, along with a reflective awareness of that commotion (Lyons, 1980, 1-
16).  According to Lyons, because the passions are sensation-like for Descartes, they are 
unable to provide any cognitive content and, because passions clearly incorporate cognitive 
elements, Descartes fails to provide an adequate account.  
  
The passivity of the passions is a difficult issue for Descartes. He cannot hold that the 
emotions have the cognitive status of judgments. If they did they would be actions of the 
soul, not passions. On the other hand, if the passions are conceived as modes of the soul with 
respect to which we are entirely passive, in the sense that they are subjectively meaningless 
happenings, then it is unclear how they could play any role in the regulation of good conduct. 
  
Lyons, in effect, challenges Descartes’s claim that the passions, as perceptions of bodily 
sensations, can be attributed to the soul. His suggestion is that although Descartes considers 
the passions to be a species of thought, he is not justified in his move from passions as 
awareness of bodily commotion to the cognitive phenomenon that typically describes an 
emotion. Consider Descartes’s account of fear. According to Lyons, Cartesian fear amounts 
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to the awareness of the machine of one’s body turning and running away. Fear exists due to 
the motions of spirits, which in turn is caused by something like the perception or imagining 
of a strange animal. While a person’s past experience with animals will influence her fearful 
responses to them, that experience is not part of the emotion per se. Furthermore, if fear is a 
bodily state and awareness of that bodily state, the desire consequent upon the mechanistic 
motions (the ‘I want to get out of here’) isn’t part of the passion either. The judgment that I 
ought to get out of here is an action of the soul and cannot be part of the passion. According 
to Lyons, Descartes’s account of fear is neither able to give us knowledge of the world nor 
does it reflect an attitude about the world: “It merely registers, as a feeling, our physiological 
changes and bodily movements.... fear is not an awareness that something is frightening and 
that I am fleeing, it is the subjective concomitant feeling of my flight and of my being 
physiologically in a certain state” (Lyons, 1980, 6). Descartes’s theory cannot account for the 
connection between the awareness of bodily commotion attributed to the soul, and the 
emotion of fear proper because sensations themselves do not lead one to act. Awareness of a 
rapid heart beat, the onset of perspiration, and an immobilizing sensation do not by 
themselves lead one to flee. They will only do so when combined with the further awareness 
that one is in danger and should get out of harm’s way.  This latter, necessary component of 
the phenomenon, is not strictly passive, nor strictly bodily and thus not available to 
Descartes. 
  
If Lyons’ complaints were correct, Descartes’s account of the emotions would preclude a 
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connection with practical reason; however, the Cartesian account is richer than Lyons grants. 
To see this, let us be clear about what Lyons’ objections are. First, he claims that the 
awareness of bodily commotion attributed to the soul is not sufficient for the formation of an 
emotion which has cognitive import for the agent. As a simple feel the passion fails to 
constitute the thoughts or perceptions Descartes takes them to be. And second, he claims that 
as an awareness of bodily agitation referred to the soul, the passion has no reference to 
anything other than the soul-body union. The passion cannot provide any knowledge of the 
world, nor can it reflect an attitude about the world because it has no reference to anything 
outside of the soul-body union.  
  
Given Descartes’s proclivity for explanation involving reference to blood flow and animal 
spirits, it is perhaps understandable that interpretations of his account overstate the 
physiological components while discounting the normative dimension. However, when 
regarded as a systematic means of protecting and enhancing the union of soul and body, 
Descartes’s mechanistic account can be seen to be both intelligibly motivated, and beyond 
classification as a simple feeling theory. Passions are not judgments nor are they simply the 
awareness of a bodily state. Lyons’s reading, while not implausible, ignores other important 
aspects of Descartes’s account.   
  
The first objection attempts to drive a wedge between the bodily movements which result in a 
passion, and the passion as a form of thought or attribute of the soul, thereby depriving the 
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passions of their guiding function for the soul. However, Descartes is clear that the passions 
are an information resource: “the principal effect of all the passions in men is that they incite 
and dispose their soul to will the things for which they prepare their body, so that the 
sensation of fear incites it to will to flee, that of boldness to will to do battle, and so on for the 
rest” (Descartes, 1989, A40). This can be consistently interpreted as implying that the soul-
body union is merely disposed to respond to its environment without being aware of the 
disposition as a reason and so is merely caused but not informed. However, attention to 
Descartes’s texts demonstrates that it is part of Descartes’s account of the human design plan 
that the passions function in us as reasons.  
  
Descartes’s discussion of fear includes the claim that the blood is rarefied and transmitted 
through the body in such a way that the back may turn and the legs may begin to run away, 
but also includes the claim that the spirits excite a particular movement in the pineal gland 
“which is instituted by nature to make the soul feel this passion” (Descartes, 1989, A36). 
Lyons interprets this to imply that the delivery of this passion to the soul is a simple 
sensation, but it is not. According to Descartes, the body is set up in such a way that certain 
movements of the animal spirits naturally coincide with fear as a perceptual state of the soul. 
One need not infer from one’s rapid heartbeat and trembling limbs that one is fearful, because 
persons are so designed that the significance of the embodied state is by our nature 
represented to the soul directly by the emotion (albeit via the pineal gland to the soul). This 
can be seen from Descartes’s remark that the purpose of the passions is to “dispose the soul 
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to will the things nature tells us are useful and to persist in this volition” (Descartes, 1989, 
A52). In the case of fear, nature tells one not only that one’s heart is racing, and one’s legs 
are trembling, but simultaneously informs one that the situation is dangerous. The same 
conception of a naturally beneficial mechanism is found in Descartes’s discussion of pain in 
Meditation Six, where he notes that God could have constructed us so that when in pain one 
was only aware of the actual motion occurring in the brain, and was not stimulated to get rid 
of the pain. However, the design plan most conducive to the continued well-being of the body 
is one which immediately informs the soul of bodily actions in a meaningful way, and this is 
the one which God has invoked (Descartes, 1985, 60-61). 
  
In other words, Descartes’s theory of the passions attributes natural meanings to our inner 
states as a consequence of our design plan. His insistence that we have the capacity to correct 
the natural meanings conveyed by the body can be seen as yet another way we are designed 
to reach the truth. Fear and other passions are, as Descartes describes them, perceptions or 
thoughts proper and not simple sensations.3 The passions, “according to the institution of 
Nature... all have reference to the body, and are given to the soul only insofar as it is joined 
with [the body], so that their natural use is to incite the soul to consent and contribute to 
actions which can serve to preserve the body or render it more perfect in some way” 
(Descartes, 1989, A137). Of course, the question of whether meaning can arise out of natural 
design is a vexing philosophical problem, currently much-discussed in philosophy of mind. 
My claim is not that Descartes has solved the problem by appeal to benevolent design. 
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Rather, my claim is that a reading of Descartes’s theory of the passions which neglects this 
crucial part of his account is flawed. Descartes’s mechanistic model is specifically designed 
to make the operative connection between bodily agitation and a perception of the soul. 
  
All of the passions represent “the goods to which they tend” (Descartes, 1991, 264). Moral 
philosophy has as its principal utility the regulation of desires, through desire we are led to 
act, and so our good depends upon a well-ordered character. Descartes’s account of the 
natural value of the passions for human well-being rules out a feeling theory interpretation of 
his passions in favour of one in which their occurrence is significant of harms or goods, 
precisely in a way which gives them a role to play in guiding behaviour. 
  
Lyon’s second objection is that because a passion is, for Descartes, an awareness of bodily 
agitation attributed to the soul, it has no reference to anything other than the soul-body union 
and thus cannot represent a perspective on the world. I have already argued that attention to 
Descartes’s texts suggests that for Descartes the passions do have axiological relations as 
normative content. The soul-body union is so designed that when the body is excited by the 
presence of something frightening, for example, the soul experiences fear directly without 
requiring an inference or judgment from the fact of bodily agitation to its fearful import. 
Descartes’s account is, in this respect, strictly parallel to his account of visual perception 
where the sense organs are excited by an object outside the body and the soul recognizes the 
object directly without requiring an inference from the effect of the animal spirits on the 
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brain to its awareness that it sees the object. The parallel with perception is only partial 
however. We should not take Descartes to be attributing fear to the external objects which 
give rise to the agitation of the body.  
  
In perception the soul attributes a property to the object perceived. When fearful, the soul 
does not refer the property of fear to the external object. Fear represents a relation between 
the thing feared and the one feeling fearful. It is an axiological relational property, identifying 
the relation which that object has to the soul-body union as it pertains to its well-being (its 
‘being a threat to me’). Passions of the soul represent the soul as affected in a manner which 
connects the passion to its object. Some passions are influenced by judgements, but the 
passions themselves are not judgements: “Passions represent the state of the soul as a 
consequence of its relation to objects and thus are reasons, whether good or bad, for forming 
certain judgements and initiating certain actions” (Brown, 1999, 228). As representations of 
the state of the soul-body union in its environment, passions have normative significance. 
Descartes takes their guiding function to be integral in their design, noting that “objects 
which move the senses do not excite different passions in us in proportion to all of their 
diversities, but only in proportion to the different ways they can harm or profit us or, 
generally, be important to us” (Descartes, 1989, A52).  Fear and other passions are attributed 
to the soul and their correlation with bodily states is an arrangement instituted by nature. This 
arrangement, although mechanical, is not deterministic; the passions incite and dispose the 
soul to will but do not determine it. 
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The passions are part of a natural maintenance system, disposing the soul to want the things 
which nature deems useful for us. The parallel with perception resides in this: both are 
natural maintenance systems which provide the soul with information. Perceptions provide 
the soul with corrigible information about properties of the environment, and the passions 
provide the soul, again corrigibly, with information about our good. The benevolence of 
God’s design plan, according to Descartes, makes it so. Thus the well-ordered, well-
functioning soul-body union is crucial in both Descartes’s account of theoretical reasoning 
and his account of practical reasoning.   
  
Amelie Rorty has argued that in order to be able to make certain claims about the world, or to 
discover certain physical laws, Descartes requires an account of a reliable perceiver (1992). 
For perceptions to be reliable the various parts of the body need to be maintained in good 
working order, the body must be sound, protected and in good health in order to function 
well, hence a maintenance system is essential to reliable perception. On Rorty’s view, the 
perceptions of external objects along with the perceptions of our bodily states constitute an 
information system. The perceptions of our bodily states and the passions proper constitute a 
maintenance system, each of which contain subsystems. Just as each of the modalities of 
sense provide different types of information of objects outside the body, so each of the basic 
emotions have a function within the maintenance system.  
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We have a rough notion of a normal and reliable healthful body 
as one whose interactions with other bodies produces changes 
that enable it to maintain and enhance its functioning. It is a body 
whose maintenance system operates so that it feels hunger and 
moves toward food when its body is depleted, a body that is, 
furthermore, nourished by the food it eats. It is a body that feels 
pain and moves away from harmful stimuli, experiences pleasure 
at and moves toward physically beneficial interactions. It inclines 
the mind to fear what is dangerous, hate what injures it, to love 
what benefits it (Rorty, 1992, 381). 
  
The passions function in the maintenance system, but not infallibly. However, the 
maintenance and information systems need not be infallible. In order to enable reliable 
perception all that is required is that there be a means of discovering law-like correlations 
between them. The healthy body provides a baseline, not a norm, for establishing reliable 
perceptions. As long as we can recognize our own deviations from the baseline the intellect is 
in a position to make good the deficit. The hot-tempered man is in a similar condition as the 
colour-blind man insofar as each has a deficit in respectively the maintenance or information 
system. Once aware of his colour-blindness, the colour-blind man can use the system of law-
like correlations to infer that what he sees as grey is really green or red, or to refrain from 
passing judgment. Similarly, once aware of his hot temper the hot-tempered man can 
recognize his rage as an over-reaction and try “not to consent to its effects and to restrain 
many of the movements to which it disposes the body” (Descartes, 1989, A46). Through 
habituation we are able to modify our natural responses. This isn’t only relevant to individual 
deficits, Descartes’s account of perception acknowledges the naturally unreliable, but 
correctable nature of the senses. Our perceptions of the world are unreliable if not understood 
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in the appropriate way. For example, we have two different ideas of the sun: our simple idea 
makes the sun appear very small, while our idea, based on astronomical reasoning, shows the 
sun to be much larger than the earth (Descartes, 1985, 29). 
  
In a similar fashion, the passions are part of a natural maintenance system. The passions are 
part of a divinely created system which allows for the flourishing of the soul-body union.  
However, while Descartes’s account of the passions is very modern in its mechanistic focus, 
he doesn’t attempt to explain purposiveness in mechanistic terms. Non-human animals lack 
their own purposes and thus can be described in entirely mechanistic terms, but human 
animals, because they are a union of soul and body defy complete mechanistic description. A 
discussion of generosity highlights the central role freedom plays in Descartes’s account of 
the passions. Because generosity depends upon excellence in willing, it is unlike other 
passions which share some of the necessary physical features for passion mechanisms with 
the passionless non-human animals (they don’t have souls and so cannot have passions of the 
soul). Generosity, the master passion, helps to maintain the soul-body union by maintaining 
the will.    
 
Generosity 
Descartes’s discussion of generosity is important because it completes his account of self-
governance by the correct operation of the will. Our good lies in an appropriate disposition to 
value what is most valuable in us. This is the virtue of generosity. Descartes’s use of the term 
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“generosity” to denote the particular passion and virtue which he so describes is strikingly 
odd. This oddity should not be attributed to a different use of the term in his day, as 
“generosity” had much the same usage that it now has, although then it also connoted a 
certain sense of nobility.4 Descartes’s generosity includes the liberality of spirit one typically 
associates with the concept, but does so while focusing on the correct operation of the will: 
 
True Generosity, which makes a man esteem himself as highly 
as he can legitimately esteem himself, consists only in this: 
partly in his understanding that there is nothing which truly 
belongs to him but this free control of his volitions, and no 
reason why he ought to be praised or blamed except that he uses 
it well or badly; and partly in his feeling within himself a firm 
and constant resolution to use it well, that is, never to lack the 
volition to undertake and execute all the things he judges to be 
best — which is to follow virtue perfectly (Descartes, 1989, 
A153).  
 
Contrasting pride and generosity, Descartes tells us that pride is distinguished by being a 
good opinion of oneself which is based on some cause other than the correct use of one’s free 
will.5 If the cause of self-esteem is anything other than “the volition we feel within ourselves 
always to make good use of our free will, from which I have said Generosity arises, it always 
produces a most blameworthy Pride” (Descartes, 1989, A158). Generosity and pride both 
consist in a good opinion of oneself, however in the former case the opinion is just and in the 
latter it is unjust. Generosity and pride are both caused by a movement of the spirits 
composed of wonder, joy, and love; they arise out of the same sort of physiological change 
(Descartes, 1989, A160). Pride, however, entails a variability in the movements of the spirits 
which generosity does not, because the proud are more likely to be subsequently humbled. 
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The proud are slaves to their desires and thus their souls are constantly agitated. The 
generous person, whose passion doesn’t rest upon misplaced or mistaken evaluation, will 
experience a movement of that passion which is in comparison, firm and constant. 
 
Although generosity and pride can be referred to the same body-based cause, they are distinct 
passions. The difference between pride and generosity rests in the agent’s just or unjust, 
accurate or inaccurate, perception of her own sound functioning. In at least some cases 
passions are distinguished by the intentional object they represent.6 Pride and generosity are 
distinguished by their different intentional objects which will vary in accordance with 
differences in the agent’s attitude and beliefs. The passions must be understood not as 
mechanisms operating independently of cognitive constraints, but as complex states with 
intentional components.7 Descartes’s remarks on generosity indicate that we play an 
important role in the functioning and refinement of our passions insofar as we have some 
capacity to determine the passion’s referent. Because the passion represents a relational 
axiological property, Descartes’s account of the passions has the resources to build a morality 
on the proper ordering of the soul. We should strive to esteem ourselves appropriately. This 
will require directing our attention away from those aspects of our behaviour over which we 
have little control toward the quality of our willing in thought and action. 
 
Passions have two necessary features: they must have a good use, and they must be caused, 
maintained, and strengthened by some movement of the animal spirits (Descartes, 1989, 
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A176, A27). Generosity is useful to us because it combats vain desires, manifesting an 
understanding and appreciation of the will which curtails futile concerns. Not only is it 
useless to fervently desire something which one has no capacity to bring about, it is 
detrimental insofar as it occupies one’s thoughts and thereby distracts one from desiring what 
is within the realm of human acquisition. Generosity also counters excessive anger, results in 
a virtuous humility, leaves one full of good will for others, and makes one the master of her 
own passions (Descartes, 1989, A203, A154). Generosity makes us esteem what is in our 
power; what is not within our control deserves little esteem. Generosity makes “us greatly 
esteem liberty and absolute dominion over ourselves, which we cease to have when we can 
be injured by anyone, it limits us to having scorn or at most indignation for the wrongs at 
which others usually take offense” (Descartes, 1989, A203). The generous are masters of 
their own passions and, while inclined to take on great tasks, will not take on anything 
impossible. Aware of our imperfect nature, and still aware that every person has the capacity 
to use the will properly, the generous person will demonstrate a virtuous humility. She will 
demonstrate a good will for all and will never scorn others, because she will realize that all 
persons have the capacity for generosity and that errors must be due to a lack of 
understanding rather than a lack of good will (Descartes, 1989, A154).  
 
Generosity is the master passion, involving three components. First, the generous person 
recognizes that she is most fundamentally her free will; second, she understands that she 
ought only to be praised or blamed according to the operation of this faculty; and third, the 
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generous person must be resolutely disposed to use her will well. The emphasis on free will 
is, of course, a well-established feature of Descartes’s philosophy. In Meditation IV, when 
Descartes considers how it is possible that God might have made him such that he is prone to 
error, he concludes that God has given him a perfect free will, and error arises only through 
his own misuse of it. It is his free will that assures Descartes that he has been made in the 
likeness of God. Non-human animals, whose movements are determined, are not appropriate 
subjects of praise. What is praiseworthy in a person is his success at authoring his own 
actions: “The supreme perfection of man is that he acts freely or voluntarily, and it is this 
which makes him deserve praise or blame” (Descartes, 1985, 205).  Mastery of the operation 
of one’s will is thus of fundamental importance in agent evaluation, because the will is all 
that is entirely under one’s control and thus its actions are the proper objects of evaluation. 
The connection between the free will and the good is prominent in Descartes’s writings on 
morality.  
 
The third component, that the generous person have a settled and sure commitment to use his 
will well, marks generosity as a disposition and virtue which itself manifests an appropriate 
evaluative response to one’s own nature.8 The generous person is characterologically 
disposed to value what is valuable in us. Hence, the virtue in generosity is the unification of 
theoretical insight and practical commitment. Our free will is not merely the source of that 
which makes us appropriate subjects of praise, but because the will can be used well, the 
perfection of the will is the source of the agent’s own good. Virtue is our supreme good 
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(Marshals, 1998, 149).  
 
According to Descartes, the supreme good of each person “consists only in a firm will to do 
well and the contentment which this produces” (Descartes, 1991, 324).  The moral quality of 
a life depends upon the operation of the will because it alone is absolutely within our 
disposal. Excellence in willing is thus a way of perfecting what is most essential to the self. 
The will cannot be better disposed than  
 
by a firm and constant resolution to carry out to the letter all the 
things which one judges to be best, and to employ all the 
powers of one’s mind in finding out what these are. This by 
itself constitutes all the virtues; this alone really deserves praise 
and glory; this alone finally, produces the greatest and most 
solid contentment in life. So I conclude that it is this which 
constitutes the supreme good (Descartes, 1991, 324-5). 
 
Cartesian generosity is a foundational epistemic and moral virtue as well as a passion. The 
passions are an important part of the machinery of our bodies and are mechanisms that we 
can, indeed must control and develop. The passions are part of the human machinery supplied 
by a benevolent Creator and, insofar as they are mechanisms, their role in our design plan is 
to guide us roughly toward what is in our interest. Both human and non-human animals are 
constructed in a manner which is overall advantageous to their survival, however because 
non-human animals lack free will and rationality their mechanical ordering is not in any 
respect under their control. The design of human mechanisms is more complicated and it is 
part of that design that they be partially under voluntary control in the soul-body union. 
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Descartes acknowledges exactly this when he develops the idea of generosity as the master 
virtue and passion which leads the will to choose rightly and value rightly those things 
presented to it.  
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NOTES 
 
1. This is a large and important tension in Descartes’s thought. In this paper I do not evaluate his success in 
resolving this tension.  
2. For example, Patricia Greenspan refers to a Cartesian account of emotions as sensations (Greenspan, 1988, 
3). William Alston counts Descartes among feeling theorists (Alston, 1967, 480). See also Cheshire Calhoun 
and Robert Solomon (Calhoun and Solomon eds., 1984, 8-11). 
3. For further discussion of Descartes’s naturalism see Eric Dayton’s “Could It Be Worth Thinking About 
Descartes on Whether Animals Have Beliefs?” (Dayton, 2004). 
4. Stephen Voss notes this in a translator’s footnote on p. 104 (Descartes, 1989).  
5. In some translations other than the Voss translation used here, “pride” is translated as “vanity”, which more 
clearly expresses the vice involved in that form of passionate response. 
6. Stephen Gaukroger complains that Descartes’s only means of explaining differences in temperament is 
through a “tennis-racquet” account of the workings of the pineal gland. If I am correct, this charge is mistaken 
(Gaukroger, 1995, 402). 
7. de Sousa’s notion of the “paradigm scenario” is useful in thinking about such variability because it 
acknowledges the essential biological component of an emotion while accommodating diversity in the 
normative functions and significance that emotional responses may come to possess. “Paradigm scenarios 
involve two aspects: first, a situation type providing the characteristic objects of the specific emotion-type...and 
second, a set of characteristic or “normal” responses to the situation, where normality is first a biological matter 
and then very quickly becomes a cultural one” (de Sousa, 1987, 182). 
8. While it does seem legitimate to question the plausibility of describing generosity as both the peculiar kind of 
passion that it is and also a virtue, for the purposes of this paper, this question will go unanswered. For an 
insightful discussion of how generosity can be both a passion and virtue, see Lisa Shapiro’s “Cartesian 
Generosity,” (1999). 
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